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TRANSCRIPT OF THE 23 RD ANNIVERSARY SPRING SYMPOSIUM 
March 24, 2015 
MR. GLOFFRLY SANT; I just want to repeat, thank you to all the 
different organizations and groups that have supported us today, and 
especially to Greg Wong, who really kind of kicked everything off in 
the very beginning. 1 hope that this is the beginning of a yearly 
collaboration with both the Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, and also Cardozo Law itself. Chinese Business 
Lawyers Association puts on these kinds of events at many law schools 
in the New York region, and I'm very happy to start this off with 
Cardozo. 
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I want to start by thanking the members of Cardozo who are on this 
panel, and Chris Seeger was mentioned as one of the leading lights of 
the class action field. And I can verify that this man is indeed one of the 
greatest, cleanest class action litigators that you will find. I don't know 
whether you've ever heard of the NFL concussion case, that's Chris 
Seeger. If you haven't, perhaps you've heard of the drywall litigation, 
and that's Chris Seeger. We're just delighted to have him here. 
Steve Raden, we're so excited to have him. He's a partner at 
Weil, Gotshal, and when I see that this man has written the treaties on 
the corporate governance, I kid you not, he's been given prizes for his 
writing. He's written a multi-volume set that's something like 6,000 
pages on the topic of corporate governance. This is one of the greatest 
men that you could have as an adjunct professor and you should be 
delighted that he's here at Cardozo. 
In addition, we have Chuck Yablon, who has kindly agreed to be 
our closing speaker, and somehow knit together the different threads 
that we talk about today. And I'm so happy to have Chuck here. He's 
not just a great professor, but just like Steve, he's a former practitioner. 
He worked at Skadden, and I think it was Paul Weiss before that, which 
you're kind of hitting on a lot of the famous names in the field here. 
But I definitely also want to introduce the folks from my current 
law firm and my former law firm; like Kayvan Sadeghi is at Morrison & 
Foerster, where I began my own career. He's of counsel there, and is a 
very prolific writer, every year coming out with information about some 
of the key topics on securities litigation. And we're so happy to have 
him with us today. 
And lastly, I want to introduce the man that brought me away from 
Morrison and Foerster, and over to Dorsey and Whitney, that's Rich 
Silberberg. He's the Co-chair of our Class Action Litigation Group, and 
he's been representing Asian entities in class actions, here in the U.S., 
for many decades. Originally working on behalf of Japanese entities, 
and more recently we've obviously had Chinese companies become 
more and more to the forefront. Rich is a real leader in this field, and a 
kind of mentor to me, personally. 
So I appreciate having all of these people here. I'm humbled to be 
among this group and I should probably stop talking since these folks 
are here and you're not listening to them if you're listening to me. So I 
want to give us a ruling here, and I'll kick it off by asking Steve to give 
us some information about what's going on in class action litigations 
with Chinese companies today? And let's focus first on securities 
litigation, because you are one of the brightest lights in the field of 
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corporate governance. What's the recent news with securities 
litigations involving Chinese companies? 
MR. STEVE RADEN: I'm going to put off securities litigation per 
se, for a minute, and maybe even leave that to the rest of the panel, and 
talk about corporate governance. And look at securities litigation, the 
broad context, including corporate governance. And as most of you 
know, corporate governance is really Delaware law. That's where all of 
the action is, that's where most of the decisions come down from the 
courts, and there have been a number of cases—and they're in the 
package that I put together for this evening—in the Delaware courts in 
the last two or three years, which have really provoked a lot of 
discussion, scared a lot of Chinese companies, and made a lot of 
plaintiffs' lawyers very happy. 
Indeed there was a hearing last week on the settlement of a couple 
of these cases, in front of Vice Chancellor Astor, who was curious to 
know why both cases were settling for exactly the same amount of 
money, $3 million, and why the attorneys' fee in both cases was exactly 
the same, $750,000. But I'll get to those cases in a moment. 
Before 1 look at the cases I wanted to talk about a couple of big 
picture themes. And I think the biggest picture take-away is probably 
the most important and the most simple. And that's simply that the 
rules that govern directors in the U.S. apply to the directors of U.S. 
companies based in China. And that may eome as a surprise to a lot of 
directors of Chinese based companies. It shouldn't, but it is a fact now 
in Delaware. And this has important implications in both directions. 
Chinese directors need to familiarize themselves with a legal regime, 
with which they are not familiar. 
1 think it's fair to say that directors of companies that are based in 
the U.S., incorporated in the U.S., have come to the U.S. in order to take 
advantage of our capital structure. They typically go to Delaware to be 
incorporated there. They are governed by Delaware law, and they have 
to understand what the Delaware law expects of a director, and it's not 
what Chinese law expects of a director. So that's one direction. 
The other direction is U.S. directors of Chinese companies need to 
familiarize themselves with assets, and a culture, and a language that is 
very different from the culture they're used to here. And when you sign 
up to be the director of a Chinese based company, which is incorporated 
in the U.S., incorporated in Delaware, you take on responsibilities, and 
those responsibilities may well include travel, they may well include 
language requirements, at least overcoming certain language barriers 
and cultural barriers. 
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And some of the cases that I'll talk about in a moment or two, take 
those considerations and put a lot of flesh on them, and illustrate how 
directors have gotten into a lot of trouble by not understanding that. 
MR. SANT: I just wanted to mention that the book I mentioned 
earlier, the business judgment rule is the one that you were recently 
awarded the prize in, and that's over 6,000 pages long. 1 think I might 
have misspoken when I was introducing you. But you just mentioned 
cases. Is there any particular case that you had in mind that you think 
maybe illustrates some of these issues? 
MR. RADEN: There are three, but let's focus on one and we'll see 
how much time we have. This is a case called Puda Coal, P-U-D-A. 
There's been a whole bunch of securities litigations involving Puda as 
well. But now I'm focusing on the Delaware Court of Chancery 
decision. This was a decision in 2013, it was decided by way of a 
transcript ruling, and the transcript is included in the package that 1 gave 
you. And this was a very widely-circulated transcript ruling at the time, 
in part because it is so rare that a Delaware court says that the directors 
have failed in their monitoring obligations. 
You know, there were very high aspirational duties for directors of 
companies that are very low liability standards. You have to be pretty 
dam low to hit gross negligence, or anything of that ilk. And that was 
one reason this case was given a lot of attention. 
The other of which is that the judge in the case was a fellow who a 
lot of you may not have heard of; his name is Leo Strine. At the time he 
was the Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancellery; he's now the 
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. He doesn't mince words 
and his decisions in the Board of Chancellery didn t mince words, and 
his decisions in the Supreme Court are no less tame than they were in 
the Court of Chancellery. So people in Delaware listen to what 
Chancellor Strine, now Chief Justice Strine, has to say. 
And this particular transcript had a number of particularly colorful 
quotes that go directly to what we're here talking about today, and my 
theme, which is that the mles in the U.S. apply in China if you're going 
to come take our capital. And while I ordinarily don t like reading, I am 
going to read two or three of these quotes, 'cause 1 can't possibly 
summarize them as well. 
The chancellor said with respect to the complaint, and this was on 
a motion to dismiss the defendant's claim. They had reached no 
fiduciary duties and the case should be dismissed. And he said, one 
possible inferenee you can draw from this complaint is that somebody 
took hold of an American vehicle, filled it with assets, sold a large 
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amount of stock to the American investing public that independent 
direeted a ruling to go on, and be a vehicle, and get payments without 
understanding the duties they were taking on. The entire asset base of 
the company was sold out from under the independent directors nearly 
two years before they diseovered it. 
He then went on to say if you're going to have a company 
domiciled, for purposes of its relations with its investors, in Delaware, 
and the assets in operation of that company are situated in China, in 
order for you to meet your duty of good faith, [1] You better have your 
physieal body in China an awful lot. [2] The words are his; the numbers 
are mine. Better have in plaee a system of controls to make sure you 
know that you aetually own the assets. [3] You better have the 
language skills to navigate the environment in which the company is 
operating. And [4] You better have retained accountants and lawyers 
who are fit to the task of maintaining a system of controls over a public 
company. 
The duty of loyalty of independent directors who step into 
situations involving essentially the fiduciary oversight of assets in other 
parts of the world, includes understanding that if the assets are in 
China—^he then mentions two or three other loeals, but China is our 
foeus this evening—you're not going to be able to sit in your house in 
the U.S. and do a conference call four times a year, and diseharge your 
duties. 
Earlier this month, a $69 million judgment was entered in the case 
against a group of non-appearing defendants. It remains to be seen what 
the plaintiffs in that ease will be able to do with that $69 million 
judgment in China, but a $69 million dollar number, just this month, 
tells you that this stuff is pretty serious. 
And again 1 emphasize, it goes in both directions, that if you're a 
U.S. citizen overseeing a Chinese company, a public company, you've 
got to do these things. And if you're a Chinese director overseeing a 
Chinese company that's taking U.S. capital, people are going to look to 
you. And even if the default judgment is not ultimately enforceable in 
China, I don't think anybody wants to have a judgment like that hanging 
over their heads. 
MR. SANT: Thank you, Steve. And we'll have those packets for 
you to pick up as you go out. You'll definitely want to take a look, 
beeause 1 was reading through the decision myself, and it's pretty 
shocking how harsh the language was from the judge in that case, was 
really something to behold. Let me turn over to Kayvan for a moment. 
We just heard about how tough the judges in the U.S. can be in the U.S. 
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Steve was talking about U.S. directors of a Chinese company. But 
obviously that applies to the Chinese company as well. 
If you have a Chinese client who wants to avoid this kind of 
securities litigation—I know obviously, you can't completely avoid a 
securities litigation ever, and it's going to bring a suit anytime they 
want—^but how can you minimize that risk? What could a Chinese 
company focus on that maybe they don't necessarily do? 
MR. SADEGHI: Sure. Let me see if I can get one of these 
microphones a little closer. I think there are a few things. As you said, 
there's nothing you can do to eliminate the risk. That's something that I 
think a lot of people outside the U.S. don't fully understand about U.S. 
securities litigation. In particular, it's really best to view it as a cost of 
doing business in certain ways. People in other countries sometimes 
take incredible personal offense at the notion of a securities litigation 
and want to know how they can fight back, and things like that; and 
understanding in some sense this may happen and may not be 
preventable, I think is important. 
But that said, there are a lot of steps that should be taken, and 
picking up on what Stephen just said, really the key to it is to 
understand that the same rules apply if you are a company with your 
operations elsewhere as it would to a U.S. company. And I think the 
biggest overall take-away is transparency, and that's one of the hardest 
things to get across to people in other cultures, sometimes, who aren't 
used to this sort of disclosure obligations that come with your U.S. 
securities laws. 
And there are a lot of aspects of that, but I think developing an 
effective set of internal controls is obviously one of the key things and 
one of the things that the counsel [phonetic] focused on. That's 
something that can definitely be done in advance. 
I think another thing that's very important is to develop consistent 
and careful disclosures. This is somewhere where having counsel that 
operates both in China and in the United States is important. There 
have a number of cases—I know they're referenced in the materials— 
that look at the discrepancies that can exist between disclosures in the 
United States and disclosures in China; that doesn't necessarily indicate 
a misstatement. There are reasons for these discrepancies, chained to 
different accounting standards and the like. 
But it's important for companies to consider that issue and to have 
counsel that really imderstands the regulatory landscape in China and in 
the United States, and to be thinking about disclosure obligations in 
both countries, and trying to minimize discrepancies, or at least 
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understand them, is very helpful. 
MR. SANT: Now in just a little bit I'll open this up to the audience 
to start asking questions. But let me ask a question that 1 think quite a 
few people are interested in already. You know, of course, of the recent 
high profile accusations and litigation being brought against Alibaba. 
There's a lot of discussion about a white paper that was put out by the -
- administration for industry and commerce that was later withdrawn. 
What are your thoughts about—how would a U.S. court react to 
that. That's not a document that Alibaba created; it's a document from 
the government. The government has now withdrawn it for whatever 
that means. How do they deal with that kind of a scenario? 
MR. SADEGHI: And this is, I think, one good example of how 
fact-intensive the inquiries really have to be. And it really comes down 
to a question of disclosure obligation. There are a couple of different 
issues it raises, but one large one is disclosure obligation and where that 
obligation attaches. 
The white paper, for people who aren't familiar, came out 
relatively recently this year, but referenced conversations with the top 
executives at Alibaba, that took place in July, prior to the IPO 
[phonetic], and actually included a statement suggesting that the port 
was not released sooner to not interfere with the IPO, which was people 
who practice in the United States, it's pretty impossible to imagine an 
SEC analog to that situation. 
But I think the issues it raised; there are two primary issues that it 
raises for me. One is a question of whether the report itself suggests 
that there will be some further adverse action to the company, so that 
the issuance of the report is itself an event. And another issue that that 
raises is the conduct underlying the report. A report like this provides a 
link that is often hard for securities litigants to satisfy, which is to show 
that some events going on at a company were actually raised to the level 
that they were red flags management should have been aware of. And 
showing that any omission or material misstatement was something 
done with the recusant knowledge or recklessness is something very 
difficult. 
The existence of a report like this that mentions that regulators in 
China were meeting with top executives of the company suggests that 
issues were brought to their attention much earlier and it's an easy way 
for plaintiffs to meet that threshold, or at least the potential to meet that 
threshold. So it sort of depends on which aspect you look at, whether 
you think there will be an event that results from it, or whether it's 
related to the underlying disclosures and for the underlying issues. 
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And then with that, in the U.S. we have a bit more of an 
established body of law with respect to the way the SEC works. 
There's a Wells Process that is very familiar to the courts, they know 
what a Prewell submission looks like, they know what the Wells 
Process means. It's generally when the SEC indicates to a company 
that it's planning to bring an enforcement action. 
There have been cases recently, including a case against Goldman-
Sachs, suggesting that the existence of a wells notice does not 
automatically create a duty to disclose, but there's at least a body of law 
that allows courts to understand what that notice, that sort of report from 
the SEC means. I think the U.S. courts would be much less familiar 
with something like an SAIC white paper means, what the retraction of 
it might mean, and so it'll really come down to a fact-intensive inquiry, 
and that's where having counsel that's familiar with sorts of issues that 
trigger disclosure obligations is important. 
I think people in many other countries, not just China, who don't 
operate in the common law system, aren't used to - - civil systems, are 
not used to systems with so few Bright Line rules and really, you have 
to develop an expertise over time and sort of know when you see it, as 
far as whether something is material. So something like this white 
paper situation is just caution to take things on a case-by-case basis. 
MR. SANT: Sure. And I'll just tell the audience, I'm going to 
open it up for questions in a little bit. But get your questions in your 
head ahead of time; because what I find often happens is people are 
excited to be the first one asking the question, and then at the end you 
have 50 hands up. So you can be the first one to ask and we'll then hear 
it. 
I did want to follow-up though, Kayvan, in one other aspect of the 
Alibaba case, 'cause I know that's something that's so hot right now 
and a lot of people are really interested in this. One of the things that 
was somewhat unusual about their IPO prospectus was in the risk 
factors. They actually listed a risk factor of being, if you obtain a 
damages award against us in the U.S., you may not be able to collect. 
What do you think of that? What do you make of that? Is that just an 
example of, you know, what some people say, risk factors have 
everything under the sun put in there, and meteor strikes and things like 
that are probably going to be in there someday. Or is this seriously an 
issue, and if so, who is it of concem to? 
MR. SADEGHI: Yeah, I think it's a very interesting question and I 
think the $69 million recent judgment from - - defendants is an 
indication that there are some companies that will essentially take their 
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chances, allow a default judgment in the U.S. and basically say, come 
and enforce it. And there are real issues with trying to enforce the U.S. 
judgment in China. So I don't want to suggest that's not a concern. I 
think that's less of a concern for companies like Alibaba. Companies 
that either are likely to consider a return to the U.S. capital markets for 
capital in the future; companies that have any U.S. operations would be 
another type of company where that's less of concern. It strikes me as 
relatively unlikely that a company like Alibaba would decide not to 
appear and accept a default judgment, and then say come and enforce it. 
As compared to some other companies. 
MR. SANT: It's not just, not appearing, it's also losing. You could 
fight the case for five years, lose, and have the judgment, and what if 
your assets are in China, then you have the same problem. 
MR. SADEGHI: Right. And that's where I think with companies 
of the scale of Alibaba, in particular, so few securities litigation matters 
go to trial that likely resolution would come before that, and it's not 
clear that it would get to that stage. If it got to that stage it may be an 
issue. I think it's a much bigger problem for companies that are 
smaller, that really have—or are less likely to want to return to the 
capital markets here that are less high profile. I think there it becomes a 
real concern. I'm reading tea leaves to an extent, but it strikes me that 
for a company the scale of Alibaba, it's less likely to be a concern. 
MR. SANT: Sure. And in a little bit we'll ask our resident - -
attorney what he thinks on collecting judgments from China. I did want 
to say, though, I thought there was a really weird paradox that in the 
risk factors they said you might not be able to obtain damages from us; 
because usually the purpose of putting risk factors in is to avoid liability 
for not warning about it. But if you don't think that they can collect on 
the damages, what's the point of warning in the first place? I'm just 
kind of befuddled. 
MR. RADEN: What I'm wondering is—and I apologize for 
monopolizing; it's the last thing I'll say before everyone else talks—but 
what I'm wondering is, as you said, no one ever goes to trial. Does this 
give the Chinese company, or any foreign company whose assets might 
not be able to be reached through a U.S. judgment, an ability to go to 
trial? Whereas a U.S. company wouldn't, because a U.S. company 
wouldn't go to trial, because they can't afford to lose. Maybe a foreign 
company can afford to lose and can go the distance because the 
judgment can't be collected. 
MR. SADEGHI: And I do think that this is one of the factors. 
Again maybe the plaintiffs perspective is more important than mine on 
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this issue, among others. But I think that the risk of enforcement is 
something that really impacts the settlement value, and we've seen a lot. 
The settlements we've seen out of securities litigation involving 
Chinese companies tend to be comparative low value. I thi^ that 
factors in not only enforcement risk but some of the difficulties in 
actually prosecuting securities litigation involving the Chinese 
company. I'm not sure that would apply the same way to Alibaba. 1 
can imagine some people thinking that that is a big enough fish that if 
they chase it long enough there'll be something there, unlike maybe 
some other. , 
MR. SANT: I think Stephen's point just a moment ago was truly 
fascinating, because I think a lot of people who don't closely follow 
securities litigation don't realize just how rare it is for one of these cases 
to actually go to trial. It is so incredibly rare. If you have one in a year, 
that's a lot. It's really rare for these to go the distance, as Stephen put it. 
Usually they're either dismissed or you settle; you rarely have it go 
all the way to the end in - - your company litigation scenario. And so as 
Stephen said if a Chinese company is willing to take that risk because 
they think you can actually collect on it, we mi^t actually start to get 
some judgments in here. So that's really fascinating. 
I wanted to turn it over to Rich, because as I mentioned initially, 
one of the reasons I jumped over to join Rich at Dorsey was because of 
Rich's four decades-plus of experience doing class actions and 
litigations for Asian companies, both Japan and elsewhere in Asia. And 
I wanted to ask you about if both China and Japan, and just generally in 
Asia, what do you think are some of the myth perceptions that people 
have'here in the U.S. about Asian companies or Chinese companies and 
how they respond to suits? ^ , T U 
MR RICHARD SILBERBERG: Well thanks, Geoff, and I will 
answer that question, but I'll take a lead Ifom Stephen and answer a 
different question first. 
MR. SANT: Sure, why not? 
MR. SILBERBERG: For those of you who are following this 
discussion about the risk factors that were disclosed in the prospectus by 
Alibaba, but are not precisely familiar with exactly what was said, I ve 
included those in the materials. And I thought I might just read it; it s 
an extraordinary paragraph. I, for one, have never seen a disclosure like 
this in a prospectus. T i ^ 
It reads as follows: We are incorporated m the Cayman Islands, 
and conduct substantially all of our operations in China through our 
wholly foreign owned enterprises and the variable interest entities. 
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Most of our directors and all of our executive offieers reside outside the 
U.S., and a substantial part of their assets are located outside of the U.S. 
As a result, it may he difficult or impossible for you to bring an 
action against us or against these individuals in the Cayman Islands, or 
in China, in the event that you believe that your rights have been 
infringed under the securities laws of the U.S., or otherwise. Even if 
you are successful in bringing an action of this kind, the laws of the 
Cayman Islands and China may render you unable to enforce a 
judgment against our assets or the assets of our directors and officers. 
Stephen, have you ever seen anything like that in a prospeetus filed with 
the SEC? 
MR. RADEN: No. But I'm thinking about some of the options I 
have in a couple of my cases now. [Laughter]. 
MR. SILBERBERG: Okay. I just have a question for the 
audience, actually. How many of you are involved or have been 
involved in litigation involving class actions, or other high stakes 
litigation? Good. Whoever seated me next to Stephen, a plaintiff 
lawyer and a defense lawyer, [crosstalk]. Yeah, exactly. So we may 
have a differenee of opinion about eertain things, but I think that'll be 
interesting. 
The question that was posed to me by Geoff was are there any 
myths that you're familiar with or that you think are myths, about 
litigating against Chinese eompanies in high stakes litigation, sueh as 
class actions. And I think there is one. And this is putting aside the 
praetieal difficulties that are obviously involved in enforcing a judgment 
that one may obtain in the United States, in China. And 1 think that 
myth is that Chinese companies will settle cases simply because they 
don't have the resources and/or they don't want to undergo the 
embarrassment or because they are simply terrified as they should be, in 
some respects, of the U.S. judicial system. And 1 think that is a mj^h. 
In my experienee, Asian companies in particular, the Japanese 
being my first locust of experience, dating baek to the seventies, and 
more recently the Chinese companies as they embark upon doing 
business in the U.S., they are not prone to settle at early stages, or 
sometimes at any stage of the litigation that's initiated by a U.S. 
plaintiff. And 1 have heard many plaintiffs' lawyers over the years say 
to me, it makes absolutely no sense for your client not to resolve this 
matter; it's financially imprudent for them not to settle this matter; it's 
going to cost them substantially more in attomeys' fees and out-of-
pocket expenses than the settlement would otherwise cost. And my 
response to all of those things has been over the years, all of that is true. 
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But Asian companies in particular, in my experience, have elevated 
the importance of whether they are right, over financial considerations 
when it comes to resolving litigation. My clients, in particular, and 
don't think mine are an exception; if they believe that they didn t do 
anything wrong, and if they believe that the claims that have been certed 
[phonetic] against them in litigation are deficient, factually, legally, or 
both, they will not settle; even if it will be much cheaper to settle than if 
they were to litigate through trial, if necessary. And that comes as a 
great surprise to a lot of people, including judges. 
I've had judges, and magistrate judges, and mediators say to me, 
you've got to move your client in the direction of settlement. This 
makes no sense to litigate this case under these circumstances. Md 
again, my response is, they will not settle because they perceive nothing 
to have happened that violated anybody's rights. So this is something to 
keep in mind as a practical pointer. 
There are, obviously, as we discussed, some very [background 
noise] significant barriers to enforcements of judgments, and that may 
explain in some respects, why some Chinese companies, and Japanese 
companies, and others, do not settle cases because of those bamers. But 
I suggest to you that it's not just the enforcement barriers, it's because 
of a cultural view that if I didn't do anything wrong, I am not going to 
pay- . . • -. 
And where does that come from? Well in my experience again, it 
comes from a sense that even if you settle a case, and even if the 
settlement agreement contains that universal language that the 
settlement does not reflect an admission on the part of any party, of any 
wrongdoing of any kind whatsoever, these companies nevertheless view 
it as an admission of fault. They don't care what's in the agreement. 
They know that in their culture it is perceived by their colleagues as an 
admission of some kind of wrongdoing or mistake; and one loses face if 
one admits a mistake. So it's worth a lot more to them to litigate, to 
establish that they are right, rather than to make what may be a very 
modest settlement pay. 
MR. SANT: Let me ask another question, but you can not answer 
if you like. Just kidding. 
MR. SILBERBERG: I'm very proficient at that. 
MR. SANT: What about in the practice aspect, when you're 
representing, whether it's a Chinese client or another Asian client, what 
are some of the unique issues that clients in China or Japan, or what 
have you, you know, that have a very different language and a different 
culture; what are some of the unique issues that they come across when 
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they're dealing with class actions? 
MR. SILBERBERG: It's a broad question with a long answer, 
which I will try to keep short, and then if there's time, we can go into it 
at greater length later. And I'd be curious as to whether Chris sees this 
from the flipside, from the plaintifPs point of view when one is 
litigating against a Chinese company. 
MR. SANT; Your comments are right on. - -. That pushback. 
MR. SILBERBERG; In terms of...? 
MR. SANT: [Off mic]. 
MR. SILBERBERG: I'd be curious about your comments, because 
that has been my, almost consistent, experience throughout. And by the 
way, you scared me a little bit when you said at the beginning that I'd 
been involved in this many decades. You know, many, is a dangerous 
word when you get to be our age. I'm glad you've lowered that bar a 
little bit. Okay. So if you're a U.S. lawyer who is representing a 
Chinese company in a class action, what are some of the unique 
challenges that are presented? And there are many. 
And first, amount many, in my view is the terror that Chinese 
companies and other Asian companies express when they are sued in a 
class action. And the reason that that should strike terror in the mind of 
the U.S. lawyer, trying to represent them or actually representing them, 
is that it's hard to explain to that client how our system works. And just 
as one illustration; before I left the office, just to satisfy my curiosity I 
took a look at the number of class actions that were commenced against 
Lenovo, the computer manufacturer, earlier this year, relating to a single 
incident. 
And that incident was Lenovo's apparent, or alleged, incorporation 
of software, called SuperFish, in certain of its models of computers. 
And for those of you who are not familiar with SuperFish—I had never 
heard of it until I actually saw it on my own computer screen—but it is 
a software program which directs the user to unwelcome and unwanted 
advertisements, as you are trying to either work, or research something, 
or what have you. And around February IS"', a class action was 
initiated. I believe the first one was in the Northern District of 
Califomia. And since February 15, 23 additional class actions have 
been commenced against Lenovo, based upon the identical allegation. 
MR. SANT: Are these the same claims? 
MR. SILBERBERG: The same claims. 
MR. SANT: And is this the same complaint you Xeroxed 23 
times? 
MR. SILBERBERG: Yeah. Chris is going to explain what some of 
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the practical reasons are for this phenomenon. 
MR. SANT: If we talk long enough, he'll never get to talk. 
[Laughter]. 
MR. SILBERBERG: That's true. So most of these 23 class actions 
are in the Northern District of Califomia. And try explaining to a 
Chinese company, like Lenovo—I mean, picture yourself, you're their 
outside counsel—how are you going to explain the legitimacy and the 
reasons for 23 separate cases having to be filed? And why haven't they 
all been wrapped up into one, and how do we deal with that? What you 
people are doing in the United States. 
MR. SANT: Wasn't that the point of a class action, that you had it 
all grouped together? 
MR. SILBERBERG: Correct. So I think the biggest challenge that 
one has is to develop a relationship of trust and confidence with a 
Chinese entity. And I have to say that that is a work in progress, even 
for me, in situations where I literally spent 40 years representing one 
client. I'm still working on that trust and confidence relationship. 
Because that is something that's unique when you're dealing with a 
foreign company, and particularly with a company that is not used to 
dealing with a judicial and legal environment quite like ours. 
MALE VOICE: Is it a lack of trust in the judicial process here, and 
therefore you're part of that. Is that what—'eause I'm just kind of 
curious what the - - is. 
MR. SILBERBERG: It is. 
MALE VOICE: The American Counsel on foreign interests. 
MR. SILBERBERG: It is. It's a lack of trust in the judicial 
process, and it's a lack of confidence that frankly, as U.S. lawyers for 
these companies you have to come back and overcome, because there 
are perceptions that U.S. lawyers, for example, are too fast to produce 
documents that may be hurtful to the company. I mean we would never 
do that in China. Why would you do that in the United States? 
And I have to say—and this is not a joke—I have to say that even 
after 40 years of doing this—and I have a wonderful relationship with 
the client—sometimes I wonder whether they're sharing with me some 
of the documents that are good for them. Because out of a concern that 
this is really, really sensitive stuff, and once we lose control of it, you 
know, we've lost control forever. So it's a constant battle to make sure 
that you establish that trust that will enable you to represent that 
company and to make sure their rights are vindicated and to make sure 
that they comply, fully, with U.S. obligations. 
I'll just mention—then I'm going to turn it over to Chris. I'll just 
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mention one anecdote, and this does go back 35 or 40 I 
represented at that time, a nascent company, which is now one of he 
world's largest and most important multi-national corporation. And the 
then president of the company came to my office and said what is this 
And my colleague and I reached out for the document, and looked at it 
and it was plain to us that what it was a summons. And we said to he 
gentleman that it's a summons; somebody is suing you, and handed the 
summons back to him. v u i 
And it was like a hot potato. He didn't want to take it back. And 
he took the summons and he gave it to us, and he said. I ^on t accep 
this They can't do this; we will not cooperate; we don t do things that 
way; if they have something to say to us they should set up a meeting 
but we are not going to accept this. And that's kind of how they felt 
about it. You know, dispute resolution is a lot different ^y ® 
cultures than it is here, and we really have to get over that fundamental 
issue before you can go much further. , • c i 
MR. SANT: Now before, when I introduced Chris Seeger, 
mentioned that he's lead counsel in the NFL concussion case, and fee 
like you've listened now for 45 minutes to the defense counsel speak, 
you probably learned what it's like to have a concussion. [Laughter] 
So let me first ask you, is there anything that you either agree with o 
disagree with, from the perspective of this defense counsel J f ^ua y 
meant from the perspective of the plaintiffs counsel on what s been 
MR. CHRIS SEEGER; 1 think that the panelists have been very 
frank about things I've observed, just in litigating against foreign 
companies and Chinese companies. 1 thought your comments were very 
insightful. And things 1 suspected but wouldn't be privy to, being on 
the other side, you know, look there's a big 
have a very different perspective on a lot of these things. I don t ^ 
securities litigations so I'm not that helpful there. I do product liability 
litigation; mostly personal injuries, and many times, property damage. 
The Chinese drywall case involved property damage. 
The big difference, right away, that comes to mind is when you 
talk about the NFL versus a Chinese company. TJo ^FL is here^ 
They're not judgment-proof and they have assets right here. n 
knew, litigating against bringing these cases which had to be hrought, 
mean if you know anything about the Chinese drywall litigation, after 
Hurricane Katrina, tens of thousands of homes were destroyed; and we 
had a drywall shortage. They could not get enough domestically 
produced drywall. So many of the builders turned to foreign entities to 
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import the drywall. 
China, at that time, was really ramping up and looking to get very 
much involved in the U.S. building market. They wanted to avail 
themselves of the market here, and sell their drywall. The problem is 
that almost all of the Chinese drywall that came over—and I shouldn't 
say all—but a large batch of it came from a particular mine, where 
something went wrong in the mining process and it came over here with 
way too much sulphur. It had other materials in there that were not 
good, but the sulphur was the big problem; because what I've learned 
by handling this case is, sulphur is like kryptonite for copper and silver. 
So what you found is copper pipes in homes that last 100 years, 
200 years in some cases, were corroding out in 6 to 12 months. And 
copper and silver are also conductors of electricity, so appliance were 
failing, refrigerators didn't work, clocks didn't work. All kinds of 
things were failing in the homes. So not bringing the case wasn't an 
option; something had to be done, there had to be some relief. And if 
I'm giving you too much background on this litigation, just shut me up, 
but I wanted to give you al little bit of background. 
So there were really two big manufacturers that were involved 
here. One where Chinese companies owned by a very large German 
company called KDOF [phonetic]. And we didn't really have a 
problem with the Germans. The Germans appeared and they kind of 
understand it, don't like the system very much either; I'm friends with 
the defense lawyers, I get it. Even there, there were problems, but 
nothing like what we saw with the Chinese companies. And the 
defendants—ultimately the KNOF defendant, the German company 
with the Chinese mines—did sell, and we recovered probably close to a 
billion dollars there. 
The entities that are owned by the Chinese manufacturers, we 
obviously had big problems with, and we knew that we were going to 
have big enforcement issues. So we had some concem, but you just 
don't stop litigating at that point; we have to keep pushing, seeing what 
we can do. They did default; they defaulted that we had trials 
scheduled. They didn't show up and we got a default judgment. We 
got a default judgment in one of the class cases. There were these 
massive complaints where, you know, I won't get into the complexity of 
that, but there were, you know, it probably involved about 10,000 
homeowners. 
After we got the default judgment, they retained counsel. My 
suspicion is counsel was there, but they allowed them to appear. And 
they came in and they challenged jurisdiction, which led to all kinds of 
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fighting over what we could get, what we couldn't get. I'm going to 
really try to shortcut this story because it's actually—the conclusion is 
pretty fascinating. Because recently, and when I say recently, I mean 
like last week, the Chinese showed up. And I'm going to tell you why. 
So they came, they contested jurisdiction, we went over to Hong 
Kong with a group of lawyers to take depositions. They agreed to bring 
people throughout China, to Hong Kong. 
MR. SILBERBERG: Tell them why, because you cannot take 
depositions in China. 
MR. SEEGER: You cannot. 
MR. SILBERBERG: Yeah. Thank you. 
MR. SEEGER: I actually forgot that but that's why we did them in 
Hong Kong. And it was a mess. To make a long story short, it was a 
mess. We showed up to take depositions; we had an interpreter both 
sides agreed to. The Chinese manufacturer had American counsel. 
They also hired an interpreter to be what they called a challenge 
interpreter. I've taken depositions throughout the world, never 
experienced this before, but what it turned into was three days of our 
interpreters fighting. And at one point, almost a fist fight, no kidding. 
We were separating them, going that's okay, your interpretation is just 
fine. I'm sureand just separating them. And it was a mess. 
We came back to the states. Judge Fallon in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, all the cases Ifom Virginia throughout the Gulf Coast, 
Florida were MDLed [phonetic] through a multidistrict coordination, in 
fi-ont of Judge Fallon. He read this stuff and was really horrified by it, 
and said, we're going to do this again. This time, he said, I'm going to 
go over to Hong Kong and supervise the depositions. 
Now the reason I kind of worked my way into this is because what 
was really fascinating is as much as a circus as it was the first time we 
went over, we weren't really getting answers to questions. I had a 
deponent who insisted on working through the interpreter, and we had 
an English Literature, college degree, from a university in Europe. But 
he insisted that he didn't speak Chinese; there were kind of crazy things 
that went on. When we went back with Judge Fallon—and maybe it 
was his gray hair, the black robe, or whatever it is—everyone behaved 
very nicely. They conducted themselves unbelievably professionally, 
and we got answers to questions. 
Now the thing that was interesting, going into the corporate 
formalities with the governance issue, is that these entities, these 
Chinese manufacturers who did business through some American 
companies, companies throughout the world, really did not, in this 
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particular case, did not maintain any corporate formalities. And in fact, 
to make a long story short, we have one jurisdiction, we have pierced 
the vale of some of these companies, through alter-ego theories, and 
these have been upheld through the Fifth Circuit already. 
Now how did we get them back? They decided, once they lost in 
the Fifth Circuit, that they were going to take a hike, and they basically 
said, you know, we're done with this. This thing's not going really 
well. They fired their counsel, who did a great job, had nothing to do 
with their abilities, and just decided they were going to walk. 
And Judge Fallon had a real problem with that. And he entered 
criminal and civil contempt, a civil contempt order against them, and all 
of their affiliates. And for every single day they were to do business in 
the U.S., they or any of their affiliates working through them, with 
them, in concert with them, assisting them—which may include 
Alibaba, 'cause we're conducting discovery on all these issues—were 
also subjecting themselves to some problems. 
So look, in this particular case it's not a matter of somebody 
saying, I lost $5 on my stock. It's somebody's home that now needs to 
be rebuilt. And you've got this really bad material and a very active 
judge, who I think is willing to move this case and hold them 
responsible for what's going on here. So they showed up last week and 
they actually paid one of the verdicts—it was a smaller one—^they paid 
one of the smaller default verdicts; and I think that was to send a signal 
that Fallon and we have gotten their attention. 
And I'm just giving you this by way of background, 'cause I'm 
listening to some of the things that people are saying. And one of the 
comments you made before about getting the $69 million default 
judgment and then you could just go home. One thing I'm pretty proud 
of in this case is that we didn't just allow them to go home. Now we'll 
see how it all plays out. 
There may be challenges to the civil and criminal contempt citation 
that was issued against them; but it is leading to some very interesting 
discovery that the Chinese entities didn't maintain any of the corporate 
formalities, and that there were some interesting relationships with 
some U.S. sophisticated entities that are going to be interesting for us to 
delve into. So we're basically just going to keep the pressure on until 
this gets resolved for the homeowners. 
MR. SANT: There's one aspect to what you said that struck me 
right in my heart, 'cause as a person who came into law after focusing 
on linguistics first, I've always been fascinated by the language side of 
it. And a lot of times when I'm in depositions involving Chinese 
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entities, I'm the one who's being that annoying—objecting to the 
translations a lot. 
But from my view, I feel like it's a hugely problematic issue; 
because I think a lot of Americans, there's an old joke, in the U.S., if 
you speak three languages we say you're trilingual, if you speak two, 
you're bilingual, if you speak one, you're American. [Laughter]. 
Americans don't sometimes understand that languages don't work like 
an equation, where you plug this word, or phrase, or sentence in, and 
then you pop out that one, and there you have it; and that's the correct 
translation. We're done. The languages operate so differently. 
MR. SEEGER: Yeah, we learned that, because many of them 
spoke Mandarin as their main dialect, but then there are Cantonese— 
MR. SILBERBERG: Some dialects I get—well Cantonese was a 
whole nother thing. But I guess apparently some of the witnesses lived 
in certain parts of the country, where while it was Mandarin, it was also, 
you know, so the translation issues were real, but like I said, that 
happened to turn into a circus. We fixed it. 
MR. SEEGER: Yeah. With the Mandarin Language, since the 
birds normally don't have tenses, for example. Or the nouns normally 
don't have singulars and plurals, or things like that. You can just 
imagine how deeply significant that can be when the translator is 
making a guess as to whether the person was referring to multiple times 
in the past versus one time in the present. That's hugely different, and 
significant, and that's not even going into some of the other issues. 
Yeah, go ahead. 
MR. SADEGHI: I had an instance recently. It had nothing to do 
with my legal practice and nothing to do with this presentation, but this 
was shown to me by somebody. There was an article in the New York 
Post that somehow got picked up by the Chinese press, and translated 
into Chinese, and when you click on the button it says, see English 
translation from the Chinese back to the English. It had no relationship 
whatsoever to the original English. 
MR. SANT: I actually got a copy of the Chinese version of the 
white paper that was issued on Alibaba, and I was just taking a look at 
it. If I was Alibaba's counsel how would I read this document? And I 
can give you a couple of examples. They talk about wenti [phonetic], 
right? wenti could be translated as problem, so maybe Alibaba has a lot 
of problems. But it can also be translated as question; it can also be 
translated as issue. So depending on how you interpret that single word, 
either they're talking about problems at Alibaba, or they're talking 
about issues that they want to go over with Alibaba, which is very 
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different in meaning. v .. 
Or another issue that came up in depositions and how it is, how 
would you translate ja-chung [phonetic]? If you translate that as, h e 
strengthen, like we need to strengthen our capabilities. ^ ™plies that 
your capabilities are weak, you need to strengthen it. But if I d inteipret 
it differently, if I'd interpreted it ja, as further, and chung is strengt , 
further strengthen; now my capabilities are strong, and I m just making 
them even be whether you interpret it as strenghen or 
further strengthen, because they're both completely fair. But the 
interpretation has a huge significance on whether that document is now 
seen as positive or negative for you. It's just massively important, and 
think a lot of folks doing Chinese litigation, or litigation m general, yo 
think of fighting over the law or fighting over the facts, but you also 
need to fight over the language. 
I'll just point out one other thing here, m the white paper. At on 
point there's a phrase, [Chinese language]. Now this is very typical in 
Chinese. There's no subject. So it says, depending on how you 
interpret it, it says that for a long time there wasn't sufficient attention 
paid Who wasn't paying attention? Was it Alibaba not paying 
attention, was it the government that wasn't paying attention, was it the 
Snll public that Ln't paying attention? Dependtng m how you 
interpret it into English is very different meanings, and it s not clea^ 
But you need a subject in English. You cannot translate a sentence and 
leave out the subject. So you're translator has to make a decision. 
I'm sorry to go off, because that's one of my little loves 
is the language side. Now I wanted to open up to the audience, 1 m sure 
there's lots of questions because some of these topics are extremely o . 
Who would like to go first? Yes, sir. 
MALE VOICE: [Off mic]. . • , u f 
MR. SILBERBERG: It's a great question and I think that s part or 
the reason that I prefaced my comments with to first make sure that the 
client understands, in some sense, is some of the secunties litigation i 
effectively a cost of doing business, and to not take it so personally, 
agree with the comments, generally throughout, that there is a resistance 
to settling, perhaps for more than the insurance coverage, if nothing 
I think one of the other aspects of that that we've seen is we'll get 
questions as to whether there's any way to fight back; if it s a sho -
seller, for example, can we sue them for defamation. And we have to 
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explain that there are lot of good reasons not to do that. Partially 
because it's almost impossible to win that case, but also— 
MALE VOICE 1: [Interposing], That'll give them all the 
discovery they wouldn't get. [Laughter]. [Crosstalk]. 
MR. SEEGER: You have to explain that the discovery stay and the 
securities - - is a beautiful thing. Obligation to plead at such a high 
pleading burden, without the event of the discovery, is real bad for 
defendants. And to bring a claim to which truth is a defense, and open 
yourself up to all of the discovery that you are otherwise immune from; 
while motions to dismiss are pending, is not the best way to go about it. 
And I really think that it comes back to that terror that Richard 
mentioned, trying to get people to understand that some of these cases 
are going to be filed. If one suit is filed, and I don't mean to - - , the 
lawsuits, though, like cockroaches. When you see one, you know 
another one's coming. There's going to be another suit and probably a 
number of them. And to explain the process that there will be a lot of 
suits, eventually there will be a motion for lead plaintiff, that these 
things do get consolidated, but they should expect a series of lawsuits at 
the outset, is important. 
I do think some of the steps that we talk about the disclosures in 
particular, can help avoid some of these lawsuits. We know that some 
of the plaintiffs' firms have people dedicated now to specifically 
monitoring Chinese companies, and people on the ground in China, and 
looking at things like the disclosures the company's made to the 
discrepancies between them. So things like that really may help to 
some degree. As far as internal controls and other things like that, it 
may just provide a better chance of getting out of the case at an earlier 
stage, where there are failings in some of those areas, they make it more 
difficult for you. But ultimately, I agree that many of these things - -. 
MR. SANT: One thing— 
MALE VOICE 3: [Off mic]. 
MR. RADEN: Why isn't the investigation privileged? 
MALE VOICE 3: It is. [Off mic]. 
MR. SEEGER: Steve, did you want to respond? 
MR. RADEN: No, I just wanted to—on the point about your 
second unattractive alternative, which is, was be under insured. As 
someone who counsels directors of companies, I would not advocate— 
and if you're going to make that decision, you better have it 
documented that you made a business judgment that you wanted to he 
under insured. 
MALE VOICE 3: [Off mic]. 
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MR. SANT: Let's open up for other questions and we'll come back 
to you in a little bit. Do other folks have questions they'd like to ask? 
We might come back to you soon. Hey? 
MALE VOICE 4: [Off mic]. 
MR. RADEN: So the Hong Kong question was answered because 
you cannot conduct depositions anywhere else in China. That was the 
only place that we legally could do them. I understand there's some 
prohibition. 
MR. SANT: I think his question is, why would they agree to have 
those depositions in the first place if they were defaulting? 
MR. SEEGER: I think some of it has to do with some of the 
comments you heard but that we're very insightful about the risks 
involved. They did default on a big case. One was a very small verdict 
of about $2.6 million, but they also defaulted in a class case, where 
really all we'd have to do at that point is model damages and present 
them to a judge, and probably would have had it entered, and they 
would have a massive, potentially billion-dollar verdict hanging out 
there. 
So I think what—and this is hard for me to answer. My guess is 
they did some calculation and it said, well, let's go in there and do what 
we can to challenge jurisdiction. Maybe they felt they had a good 
chance at showing that the U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over the 
Chinese entities. 
In doing that, though, they opened themselves up to discovery. 
Now they were never happy about that and they fought very hard. On 
the amount of discover we should get, they pushed back on us doing 
depositions there, and then the court's response was, well, if we can't do 
them here, you can't do them there, you've got to fly them here. And 
we fought back and forth for months. Ultimately, once they allowed the 
depositions we limited it to three individuals in a pretty big entity, and a 
very limited document production where people fought for weeks over 
what the translations were. You are spot on on that. 
Both sides spent a lot of money and I know we did. But 
ultimately, the discovery that we took on jurisdiction did not bode well 
for these Chinese entities because we had enough to show, not only 
purposeftil availment [phonetic] of these jurisdictions where they 
marketed—you know, it was a great opportunity—after Katrina, if you 
were a building product manufacturer anywhere in the world, it wasn't 
just the Chinese—it was a great opportunity to start selling to U.S. 
Builders like Lennar, some of the really big builders in the country who 
had to rebuild tens of thousands of homes. So it was a great business 
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opportunity. 
We had great documents that showed purposeful availment, a 
shipping board directly to the port in Florida—Miami—and to New 
Orleans. And then we were able to also establish minimum contacts. 
What we were also able to show is that because there was not a very 
strict adherence to corporate formalities—and again, this is through the 
Fifth Circuit—we were able to pierce through the—we had alter ego 
theories we were able to basically say, these entities, this one that was 
shipping, well that's really part of all of these other entities. 
And we haven't stopped there; we're still fighting—we do think 
we're going to be able to establish that these smaller companies were 
ultimately owned by a company called BNBM, which is Beijing 
National Building Materials, and it's CNBM, which is China National 
Building Materials. Someone's shaking their head; they know, those 
are big companies. 
MR. SANT: I have a question for you on the jurisdictional fight. 
When I read the Fifth Circuit decision, 1 thought that the defendants 
had—I apologize—I thought they had a strong argument. 
MALE VOICE: You're not biased though, are you? [Laughter]. 
MR. SANT: Probably I am. I've have seen decisions that there 
was availment of the U.S. market 'cause they cut the drywall to certain 
lengths, which seemed to me a very minimal fact. 
MR. SEEGER: Well I mean that fact alone, there were a lot of 
things mentioned, but you know what, I'm glad you brought that up. 
Everywhere else in the world, they use meters and centimeters. So this 
board was cut exactly to U.S. specs. And I think it was just one brick in 
the wall that showed, you know, you were marketing that— 
MR. SANT: [Interposing]. I think he said specifics there. I'm just 
curious as to your view. Do you think that the initial decision to default 
colored the feelings of the judge and the appellate court towards the 
defendant? 
MR. SEEGER: No. If you want my view on it, and again, I don't 
have insight into what Judge Fallon was thinking. I mean I think Judge 
Fallon was—1 think if anything really got the court going was they 
came in, appeared through a really big, good law firm, they were doing 
a great job, we were making agreements on discovery. We were 
making motions and fighting back and forth, and then when they didn't 
get the decision they wanted, they said good-bye. And I think that the 
court felt like a lot of court time was wasted. This is a judge who 
actually flew over to Hong Kong to supervise depositions. 
And again, I don't want to pooh-pooh my colleagues at the 
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securities I don't do them, and I hear some of the comments about 
copying complaints and stuff, but this is a case about real people who 
have to rip all this—I mean they had their homes knocked down as a 
result of a hurricane, and now have to basically gut them again and 
rebuild them. So it's a big issue. 
MR SANT- My plaintiffs' friends in the secunty bar say our case 
is abTufrlVpeople these are people who invested all of then money 
in their 401K and lost it all. , ,, 
MR. SEEGER; Well it's true. It's true. I mean it is. Look, 1 m 
not a securities lawyer; I would imagine if there were a securities 
lawyer up here, he'd say that the market works best when it works 
effiLntly. It works efficiently based on truthful infonnation. It 
companies are not putting out truthful infoimation they should be sued. 
And they should pay people back. , tw,. 
MR SANT: It seems to me, and I'll just throw this out there an 
open it back up to questions. But it seems to me they made some 
questionable decisions, both in the initial default and ^ot appea mg 
I right away, and the time ran out. If they had appealed it they could 
have at least fought for jurisdiction further. 
MR. SEEGER: They came in late and then didn t like what they 
MII°SANT- Yeah. It seems that this is one of the issues that you 
sometimes, not always, and hopefully not usually, but you sometm^ 
have with dealing with a Chinese client is that sometimes they handicap 
their own counsel by making these unfortunate decisions. 
MR SEEGER: I'm pretty friendly with the defense lawyers on toe 
other side, and I believe that is exactly what was happening They did 
not confide that in me; when we were litigating. I just had sense that 
these guys had a very difficult client. And one thing to a point that you 
made which 1 remembered, one of the depositions we took were of the 
chairman of the entity, you know, the parent company that was selling 
the board. And they really thought this whole idea about elemental 
sulphur, off-gassing and corroding copper; he just thought that was jus 
a bunch of BS, not that he didn't think it was happening. 
But what he did is he gave me a very long speech that was 
translated, and I got it, and I saw his passion, which was do you 
understand what an important achievement it has been for the Chinese 
to not only make drywall, but the fact that it's being used ^ Chma; 
because apparently I guess it was a wet application of plaster that they 
used in homes, up until relatively recently. Drywall or wallboard really 
goes a long way to not only keeping down mold, making the house 
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drier, but helping to regulate temperatures in the home. And he viewed 
this passionately, like look, this is a great thing, we even installed this 
same board throughout China, so why are you complaining about it? 
There was a lot of that. 
MR. SANT: I do want to open it back up to questions from the 
audience. Yes, sir. 
MALE VOICE 4: [Off mic]. 
MR. SANT: I know, Kajwan, we were chatting a little bit before 
hand about the VIA [phonetic] structure. What are your thoughts on 
that? 
MR. SADEGHI: Well the only case I can think of that we've been 
involved in, they're - - into settlements. There wasn't an effort to 
actually pursue. But because there was a settlement there, that did 
work. The VIA structure leads to a lot of other complications as well. 
We actually went through to get a judgment, or a dismissal, with respect 
to a derivative suit, because the Cayman BBI laws prevent derivative 
suits, generally. So that's another complication of the VIA structure. 
But I can't think of any efforts to - -. And I know the status of the VIA 
structures, in China, has been left a little bit ambiguous, which is 
another risk factor one could layer on to all these entities. But it doesn't 
s e e m  l i k e  t h a t  i s  n e e e s s a r i l y  a n  i m i n t e n d e d  s t a t e  o f  -  - .  
MR. SEEGER: I have a case now, involving a Cayman company 
and I learned, happily for my client's sake, that in Cayman it's loser 
pay. It's not the U.S. system and that changes the dynamic of this a lot. 
MALE VOICE 4: [Off mic]. 
MR. SANT: So there was a question in the back? Yes, ma'am. 
FEMALE VOICE: [Off mic]. 
MR. SANT: Sure. You know, I think in America we often almost 
take the concept of class action for granted at this point. And it's 
sometimes surprising for us when we go abroad, how foreign it is to 
people from outside the U.S., 'cause this is truly something that most of 
the world does not accept. It's almost unique to the U.S. Sure, go 
ahead. 
MR. SADEGHI: We, typically, before we annoimce a deal, or 
before we announce bad news, we have a pool, an office pool. And 
sometimes we include the client and sometimes we even use it as a 
means to educate the client ahead of time about what's going to happen. 
And the pool question is how many lawsuits will be filed, by how many 
shareholders, claiming to represent the class of all shareholders? And 
23 or whatever the number was, is a high number, but you often do get 
four, five, six, seven, eight that are often carbon copies of each other. 
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We typically have an associate assigned to go through the 
complaints, line-by-lme, to pntduce a chatt ^ 
through who, the typos are often even copied. And the tnck is exact y 
How do you consolidate the cases? fo you redu^^^^ 
number of cases? And often the first six months of this litigation 
nothing more than consolidating the cases. transfers 
In the federal system it's easy because there are 1404A transfers, 
you can get them all sent to the same dtstnct as a ^ 
It's much harder in state court because there s no ^1= 
simply has to say, no, and back down. No, I m not got g • 
often just a forward non-convenience motion on the groirnd that we 
Sn t be httgatrng tn multiple forums. But there's a lot of 
htigation-and there's a lot ofjockeytng on both stdes^ 
MR. SILBERBERG: That's generally what the multip 
comnlaints are about on the plaintiffs side. , . , • 
MR RADEN; Yeah. On the plaintiffs side, the 
your ears—is who's going to be lead counsel and get the biggest share 
of the fee-^ And on the defendant's side, it's what's the most favorable 
?orl. And you get a lot of jockeying back and forth attd somettmes 
you end up with the same case pending in multiple jurisdiction . 
MR. SILBERBERG: Which is the worst of all possible worlds i 
you're a defense counsel. But to your question, 
said it's all about the money because the reason that 23 actions have 
W filed is so that each of them, each of the plaintiffs' lawyers that 
have brought each of those cases, can maintain a stake in the game and 
have a hope of establishing to the satisfaction 
all these cases that he or she should serve as co-lead counsel. Because 
co-lead counsel has the authority to parcel out the work that's done on 
behalf of the combined plaintiffs, and normally they will parcel out tha 
"°*So S a'station that actually was only six moriths "S"- " ^  
a class action was fried, here in the Eastern T tW sa^e 
olaintiff s firm. And then a second action was filed, also in that sam 
court by a different firm. And then two weeks later, the firm that fi e 
Z fost case, filed a second case in the Western District of Texas on 
the same facts. The pleading was identical except for the name of 
""""lied htm up; 1 said, what are you doing? ^ot a 
case in the Eastern District of New York and you were the first to file, 
which gives you a leg up. And he said to me, well, now I have two 
cases, so it's two against one. And what he was essentially saying is. 
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think having more cases is going to give me a leg up in establishing to 
the satisfaction of the judge that I should be lead counsel. 
MR. RADEN: Well I think under the PSLRA [phonetic], they also 
have to have an investor with the biggest lawsuit. I mean, before, the 
PSLRA it really was about first to file and then jockeying for position. 
It's not a practice area 1 have, and I don't—1 respectfully heard your 
comment about you hear the same things. But you don't have that, 
really, in the meshed world, or in class actions dealing with personal 
injuries or products, because most of the lawyers are actually 
representing people, as opposed to a fund, or whatever it is. 
And they get a lot more power and a lot more say in how litigation 
is conducted. So it's whacked up a little differently. Not that you need 
to know that. 1 feel like I'm not doing a good job defending the 
plaintiffs lawyer in the securities world right now, but it's not one that 
I'm not—I'm involved with. 
MR. RADEN; I think that's a good point about the PSLRA 
changing and so that really, it's the large institutional shareholders that 
will end up being the lead plaintiff. Before that it really was a race to 
the courthouse and the PSLRA in the mid-nineties really changed that. 
And I think as that's become a more structured and routine 
process, another thing for people to realize with that first flurry of 
complaints that some clients just don't understand is that these are not 
the best complaint they are going to see. They are place-holder 
complaints, they are very bare-boned, they often are essentially copied, 
just where the court ever happens to be and get something filed. But 
you're going to get an amended complaint once you have a lead 
plaintiff established. And that's going to be a much better effort, 
generally, than the initial - - complaints. So we don't want people to get 
too sanguine [phonetic] based on the first one out of the box. 
MR. SANT: I realize that the audience here varies in your 
background. The PSLRA was an act that was passed, - - go by 
Congress, and then attempt to kind of curb what I guess the defense 
counsel would see as the abuses of the securities litigation that were 
going on at the time. One really interesting aspect of it is that it requires 
judges, after the case is complete, to consider whether or not the case 
was improperly brought and they can impose sanctions if the case was 
improperly brought, where there was no basis for it. 
And one of the great success we had recently for a Chinese client, 
was the case was not only dismissed with prejudice but we were able to 
get sanctions against the plaintiffs firm that brought the case, which 
was a really nice result to get that kind of a ruling. In that instance we 
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were kind of lucky because it was one of those reverse murder cases, 
and the plaintiff suing us for a supposedly fraudulent misrepresentation, 
so the market got all their shares through the reverse merger. None of 
them bought shares on the market. 
And so when we pointed this out to the judge, the judge was like, 
how in the heck was this case brought in the first place. So it's a special 
set of facts, but it is something there for those of us defending the 
Chinese companies to make use of. 
MR. RADEN: One thing the PSLRA, which stands for Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, only applies to federal 
securities litigation. It doesn't apply to corporate governance cases, 
either brought in state court or brought in federal court under diversity 
of jurisdiction. So there still is a lot of that jockeying. And what you 
see in a lot of the state court cases is the plaintiffs put in the bare-bones 
complaint, knowing that at some point in the next two, to three, to four 
months, there'll be a lead plaintiff appointed in the federal securities 
action. 
That plaintiff will invest the money in a really good complaint and 
then so the plaintiff in the state court corporate governance case simply 
does the rope-a-dope for two or three months, delay, delay, delay, until 
they can copy the good federal securities complaint, which in today's 
world, for those of you who don't know much about securities 
litigation, really turns on what they call CWs, confidential witnesses. 
And when you become the lead plaintiff, you go out and hire a private 
investigator; where actually most of these plaintiff firms have these 
people in-house, and they use Linkedin and every other social media 
device—F acebook. 
And they find out who works for you, who's left. And they 
actually call up all of your former employees who left and are unhappy, 
and you get the complaint. And it's got confidential witness one, says 
this, confidential witness two, says that, and you actually litigate the 
motion to dismiss based on whether or not confidential witness three's 
allegation is enough to get you over the pleading hurdle. When you get 
over the pleading hurdle, you then take the deposition of confidential 
witness number three, and it turns out, confidential witness number 
three had no idea that he was talking to a lawyer, claims he never said it. 
And in fact, often when you get the eomplaint, you can figure out 
who confidential witness number three was, and confidential witness 
number three tells you, I never said those things. But you can't use it 
because it's a motion to dismiss and you're stuck with the - - of the 
complaint. 
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MR. SEEGER: It's amazing. It sounds like you're the one - - that 
really has clients that are just picked on by the [crosstalk]. [Laughter]. 
Never done anything wrong. Picking on your clients. 
MR. RADEN: I wouldn't work for anybody [crosstalk]. 
MR. SEEGER: [Interposing]. Of course. 
MR. RADEN: I think poor Chris really is going to be a big 
concussion here. 
MR. SANT: Yes, sir, in the front row. 
MALE VOICE: [Off mic]. 
MR. RADEN: That's a really complicated question that it's hard to 
answer briefly. But I'll tell you one answer and an anecdote. Back 
when I was at Moofa [phonetic], one of the first clients that I was able 
to bring to the firm was a company that was sued on a contract case. It 
was a U.S. plaintiff who had been hired by a Chinese firm, and he sued 
on the contract, and they brought the contract, in translation, to the 
court. And when I looked at it very carefully, I saw that some of the 
translations were clearly wrong. It was a very sloppily done translation. 
And so we pointed that out and made the motion to dismiss as a 
non-convenient form—a form non-convenience—and said that the ease 
should go to China. It's an employment litigation, the contract's in 
Chinese, most of the witnesses are in China, this case doesn't belong 
here. And in response to pointing out the errors of their translation, they 
hired a good translator who came back with a new translation. 
And so we said to the judge. Your Honor, we have now three 
different translations of the same document; their first translation, our 
response translation, and then their new translation. This just proves 
our point that the U.S. is the wrong forum to be deciding this issue. 
And the judge agreed and kicked the case out and sent it to China. So I 
mean it's a challenging issue, with fighting over the language, and I 
mean I eould go on for days about this, and I will try not to. Rich, go 
ahead. 
MR. SILBERBERG: Several times members of the panel have 
talked about the importance of language in these cases. And I wanted to 
pick up on that a little bit because in my judgment, if one wants to 
become counsel, representing a Chinese company, the value of being a 
Chinese language speaker, or having access in your firm to Chinese 
language speakers, eannot be overstated. Our offiee, eurrently in New 
York, has 13 Chinese language speakers because of some very 
sophisticated litigation that we're handling. 
And in my judgment you simply cannot duplicate that by going to 
outside vendors, which is what most of the time you're confronted with. 
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You have a big case, you go to a vendor who provides translators, they 
don't have, however, any context. They don't have any experience with 
the client, they re not steeped in the case. If you can provide language 
capability from your own firm, that will provide enormous comfort to 
your client. We've seen that time and time and time again. Having an 
asset like a Geoff Sant—who's one of those tribe lingual guys, or 
maybe there are four languages he's got—is an amazing commodity, 
because— 
MR. SANT: [Interposing]. I have trouble speaking one. 
MR. SILBERBERG: Because the client immediately feels taken 
care of by somebody who understands how they speak and what the 
nuances are. There was a reference made by Chris a little while ago 
about these depositions that become wars between translators. And he 
was precisely accurate. These depositions have become, frankly, 
useless. Because what happens is you'll have a translator that's been 
retained by the deposing party; you'll have a checking translator that's 
been retained by the party that's being deposed. And then the question 
is posed, and the question is translated. 
And then the checking translator says you didn't translate that 
properly. You should have said, blah, blah, whatever. And then the 
original translator will contest that and before you know it, they're 
arguing back and forth, in Chinese, with regard to what the right words 
were. And then when it's finally straightened out, if it's straightened 
out, the question is reposed to the witness, and the witness says, what 
was that question? And you start all over again. 
A kind of apociyphal story involved a product liability case that we 
handled a number of years ago. And the allegation was that a whole 
line of products were defective. They malfunctioned in a way that they 
shouldn t have. And there were some documents that were produced by 
the defendant, and those documents, depending upon who you spoke to, 
said in Chinese that they were defective. That was one translator's 
construction; or that there was a problem. Now just think about the 
difference between the words defect and problem. 
A problem may not result in any liability; a defect could. So there 
was this ongoing battle between the translators that resulted, in my 
view, in an absolutely useless transcript. And the people sitting in that 
room probably generated six figures in fees for that one day alone, 
between all of the counsel, all of the translators, all of the services, the 
court reporter, the videographer, and so on. 
^ One last point. We talked about the cultural differences and why 
it's so difficult sometimes to gain that trust of a foreign company in a 
2015] CHINESE COMPANIES & U.S. CLASS ACTIONS 759 
venue where they're uncomfortable. And Chris mentioned the 
depositions that were taken in Hong Kong, because you cannot take a 
deposition in China. Think about that for a moment. The reason that 
depositions are not taken in China is because it's prohibited by the 
government. So inevitably, if depositions are taken, you're probably 
deposing somebody who doesn't know what a deposition is, because it's 
not common there. They don't have any experience. 
So we had a case with a significant Chinese company. And the 
plaintiffs indicated that they were going to videotape all of the 
depositions. So the deposition was going to take place in a hotel 
conference room, in Hong Kong. And the first question the client had 
was, well I assumed this deposition was going to be in a court. No. It's 
not going to be in a court. Well then we're not going to go; if it's not 
going to be in a court, we're not going to go. Well you have to assure 
them that a deposition, even though it involves sworn testimony, can be 
taken someplace other than a court. 
So the next question was, well, will the judge be there? And I was 
listening very carefully to what you said about the judge overseeing 
these depositions. Because there's consternation about the prospect of 
submitting to a deposition, but there's no judicial officer there. Now 
we're used to it in the U.S. We have a notary public there, it's good. 
They're a designee; they're there to ensure that there is a sworn 
statement that the deposition testimony is correct. But try to convince a 
Chinese company that nobody needs to be there; certainly no judicial 
officer, which I'm sure made them feel much more comfortable, and 
that's why there were less disputes, because the judge was there. 
And what some companies have done in cases that we've handled 
is they have suggested to the judge that, judge, we understand that you, 
personally, can't come, and disrupt your trial schedule. But will you 
deputize a private mediator, perhaps, or a former judge, to come over to 
Hong Kong, or wherever the depositions are going to be conducted, and 
serve as that quasi judicial officer to make the client feel more 
comfortable? And that happens with great frequency. 
And then the next question is what's this about a video? I assume 
that the video means that there'll be a judge sitting in a courtroom 
who's watching. So they're eonstruction of that was that there would be 
a live video link to the judge overseeing the case while the deposition 
was going on, which of course was not the intention. 
And then think about the difficulties of that witness, after all of 
these issues and the fights with the translators, try getting that witness to 
take a look at that transcript, which now has to be translated into 
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Chinese. And have that witness also view the video tape, in order to 
ensure that he or she is comfortable that the testimony that's reflected 
there is their true testimony. It's a huge burden. 
MR. RADEN: Again it's a paradox or an etymological [phonetic] 
problem, because if the witness doesn't speak English well enough to 
testify in English, how can they verify that the deposition transcript is 
accurate? It's such a problem and you have to spend so much time 
making sure that it reflects the intended meaning is really challenging. 
MR. SEEGER: Can I add one little practical point? 
MR. RADEN: Yes, please. 
MR SEEGER: There's not much to add to what you said, 'cause 
again, you're spot on. But I would tell you this, if you're going to go— 
and maybe some of you have experience with this—but if you're going 
to go over to China and take a deposition, I would recommend that you 
act a little less like an American lawyer, and try to have more of a 
conversation. I mean I've done depositions in Germany and they don't 
like it. But in China, if you think you're going to be able to just go 
there and berate somebody, or try to embarrass them, or be rude, you're 
not going to get anything back in exchange. 
And because I saw other lawyers I try not to be an asshole in 
depositions, but at trial, that's a different story. I did try four of these 
cases in the Eastern Distriet of Louisiana, but I think the approach 
would be more conversational, more respectful, more of a dialog. I 
know that we're not really trained to take depositions that way. A lot of 
lawyers like to take them like they're cross-examinations, but, you 
know. And maybe if it's a cross, it makes sense for you to do it that 
way. But if it's a discovery deposition, you might go a lot farther if you 
try to strike up more of a conversational approach. 
MR. SILBERBERG: I completely agree with that. 
MR. RADEN: I was going to say that's not even a point or has 
anything to do with Asia or China. 
MR. SEEGER: Most witnesses, really. 
MR. RADER: With most, nine times out of ten, you're going to get 
a lot more out of a deposition even if it's a bunch of New Yorkers. You 
know, being just friendly, 'eause you want a conversation type of thing. 
MALE VOICE: I agree with that. 
MR. RADEN: I would just add to what Richard said, you know, he 
correctly laid out all the things that you'd like to happen in the 
deposition, to make people comfortable, and to make it work out, et 
cetera, et cetera. But usually that's not going to happen, because 
usually if one side wants X, the other side wants not X. And if one side 
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wants the judge there, the other side doesn't want the judge there. If 
one side—either because people are just being difficult for the sake of 
being difficult, or because they're clients really have different interests. 
So it is very rare, in my experience, to actually get people to agree to a 
protocol that will really get you to "justice." It's a game. 
MALE VOICE: One other quote—I think some of the trust issues 
that have been raised are very important, and it is difficult to do. But 
talking about how you try to build that trust, I know we try to have a 
combination; pick upon the other points - - ; having people on the 
ground who really understand the issues and are thinking of it in the 
right perspectives, and trying to find people who not just necessarily 
speak the language, but may be present. Time change can be a big 
problem, especially in the - - litigation, where people are reacting 
quickly and tension is high. 
I think it helps a lot to have counsel that we can have presence both 
in China and in the United States. People in China who understand U.S. 
securities law; and a U.S. securities litigator based in China; people who 
are also local lawyers in China, who aren't just being important. To get 
that mix is very difficult and it helps that we build a lot of trust and you 
go to firms that have that sort of presence across markets, and people in 
whatever time zone you need to be in, and can help that coordination in 
y o u r  f i r m ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t r y i n g  t o  -  - .  
MR. SILBERBERG: That's a very good point. And before we 
close this, I want to ask the panelists about what I perceive to be another 
unique challenge in representing a Chinese company in litigation, 
whether it be class actions or other commercial litigation. And that is, 
in the U.S., when we represent corporations, the people that we 
normally deal with on a day-to-day basis are the in-house counsel. And 
they are the ones that are intervening between our firms and the 
business people who are ultimately going to be witnesses and who are 
going to know where the documents are. 
And sometimes we don't appreciate the role of U.S. inside counsel 
as much as we should. And we start appreciating it when you start 
dealing with the representation of foreign countries. And when you 
deal with the representation of Chinese companies in particular, and this 
is true of Japan as well, the in-house "legal departments" are primarily, 
if not exclusively, comprised of people who are not lawyers. They're 
not trained as lawyers. They are trained by the company to do lots of 
different things. And for a period of their career, they may be in the 
Human Resources Department, and then they may go into the Legal 
Department, from the Legal Department, then they go into the Finance 
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Group. 
MR. RADEN: It's a very unusual aspect, but it's true, yes. 
MR. SILBERBERG: And during the period that they're in the 
Legal Department and you are representing the company, you are 
dealing with them as if they were in-house counsel, but they're not 
lawyers. And the ramification of that could be very serious, because 
there are privilege issues. And one of the things that one must be very 
sensitive to is that when you speak with a U.S. in-house counsel, you 
have a pretty good sense that your conversations and their conversations 
with people inside the company, who have a need to know, are going to 
be privileged. 
But when you're dealing with people who are not lawyers, and 
who are not imparting legal advice, there have been rulings that their 
communications are not privileged, and therefore you need to be 
exceedingly careful in your dealings and keep those rulings in mind. 
It's a unique problem in dealing with companies in that part of the 
world. 
MR. SANT: I'm going to seize my lucky position here as 
moderator, to add a couple more comments before 1 turn it over to 
Chuck. You mentioned about how there's fights over translation. 1 
think that should be the case. 1 really believe that you should have a 
senior litigator who knows the case well enough to know where the 
translation issues are, to seize on the ambiguity, or to seize on the 
unfavorable translation, and object to it. 
But what often happens, if you hire a person who doesn't know the 
case, from outside, to come in and act as your check, they don't know 
the case, so they don't know what to object to. And that's a huge 
problem. They can be active or not active, but they just don't know 
what is important and what matters. And it's a big problem. 1 think a 
lot of firms without the kind of experience that folks here have, people 
sometimes make that mistake and hire somebody who maybe doesn't 
understand their case. 
I'll just close with a little humorous note. You know, in 
depositions in America, they often ask in the very beginning, it's a very 
common opening question, have you taken medication today. And 1 
just find it hilarious to think how that's translated into Chinese 
sometimes. [Chinese language]. Can you imagine as a Chinese 
witnBess coming in and you sit down and you're like, alright, I've got to 
do my deposition. And the witness says, what's your name? I'm Lee 
Wong, and they say, have you had your medication today? Which, in 
Chinese it sounds like that you're saying are you—yeah, 1 was going to 
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say something that I shouldn't say out loud—are you tricking crazy-
type of question. [Laughter] 
So it's just hilarious. And I always—when I'm sitting in on the 
deposition, I'm always listening, how are they going to translate it 
We're going to have an incident again. But anyway, I want to turn it 
over to Chuck, hut before 1 do, I want to thank each of the panelists. 
Steve, thank you so much for showing your deep knowledge of 
corporate governance, and it's great to have somebody who's not just a 
partner at Weill, but also an adjunct here at Cardozo. 
And thank you, from my old firm of Morrison & Foerster. It's 
great to see you guys are continuing the tradition and Kayvan, it s great 
to have you here. And I'm so delighted to have a member of the 
plaintiff's bar join our heavy defense team on this panel, and especially 
someone like Chris, who is truly an on the Mount Rushmore of 
graduates from Cardozo. This is one of the greatest minds we've had 
come out of this school. And of course. Rich, who's been my leader 
here in my new firm of Dorsey. So take us away. 
MR. CHARLES LABLON: Terrific. Let me just echo your thanks 
to this panel. I think we had a very, very fruitful discussion here. My 
job as commentator is to give a little bit of a professorial overview and a 
few lessons learned from this discussion, which I think was filled with 
lessons to be learned. 
It's important to realize here that we're dealing with a country with 
a long standing in complex culture; one which has many unique 
institutions and methods of operations. I'm speaking, of course, of the 
United States. [Laughter]. In many ways the title for this panel 
discussion could be, Chinese Cultural Exceptionalism Meets American 
Legal Exception; because that's what this discussion seemed to me was 
focused on was the way in which bringing clients in from another 
culture, a very different culture, and explain to them the weirdness of 
American law, which we all recognize is very strange to everybody in 
the world, and maybe even more so to people who are coming from a 
different culture which doesn't share the same legal roots. 
It has different historical backgrounds, not to mention language 
that creates this very difficult system for what really requires education. 
And 1 would submit to you that a lot of what we heard here, even from 
the defense counsel, is these are lawyers who also have to act as 
teachers. And a lot of this discussion was about how you educate your 
client. How you make your client aware of the nature of the American 
legal system, all the differences that are involved in the American legal 
system. How you teach them, how you translate, and I'm using the 
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word translate, not just as a language, but how you translate different 
legal institutions. 
As we all know, language is filled with false - - . It's filled with 
words that sound the same but mean different things in different 
languages. Law is the same way. The word judge, right? They have 
China, they have judges in the United States. They are very 
different people. They are very different kinds of people; they react 
very different. Explaining all of that to clients, it seems to me, is a very 
important part of what lawyers do. 
And as these defense lawyers discuss the differences between 
American law and other systems, they're going to talk a lot about 
people like Chris. They're going to talk a lot about plaintiffs, 'cause 
one of the important differences between the way America works and 
the way most other countries work, is we regulate in part, by litigation. 
Litigation is not just about controversies and contests, it's also a form of 
regulation in the United States. 
They taught you back in the first year of court, you act at your 
peril, and then if you do something that's deemed to be negligent or 
wrongful, then you get sued. Right? And one of those things we're 
seeing here is explaining that to a group of people who are coming from 
a very different environment, where the rules are - - laid out; the rules 
tend to be explicit rather than—I think Kayvan was the one who said 
that a lot of the American rules are kind of vague and unclear, and that's 
one of the many, many differences between the systems that were 
pointed out here. 
A lot of them are obviously and I knew them before hand, like the 
ubiquity of class actions, the world of discovery, but what I thought was 
interesting was the way a whole bunch of subtler distinction between 
the American system came out in the course of your discussion. One of 
the big ones is judges. Like I say, in most of the rest of the world, and I 
think this IS certainly true in China, judges are bureaucrats. They see 
themselves as bureaucrats, they see themselves as part of the political 
system. 
In the United States, judges see themselves as, well, judges. Right. 
Wielders of the sword of justice. And some of the discussion that I was 
eanng from Stephen about if you get on the wrong side of the judge, in 
terms of the things that you've said; or if a judge decides that these are 
people who are not acting in accordance with Delaware standards of 
corporate governance, or things of that sort, the potential effects are 
very grave. 
Another interesting point, I thought, was the one that Richard was 
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making about the lack of general counsel and the fact that when you're 
trying to talk to your clients—teach your clients—you're dealing pretty 
much with the principles involved. You don't have general counsel to 
rely on, you also don't have what's become fairly ubiquitous in 
American corporate firms, compliance officers. There's no compliance 
structured mechanism which also forms a translation function for many 
American companies, as a first line of defense and as preventive 
measures. 
And that's another thing that struck me about this discussion, was 
the point that Stephen was making. These are litigators. They go to 
battle after something bad has happened. But your corporate partners, it 
seems to me, need to be involved a lot more with their Chinese clients, 
because it's not enough, obviously, to just register as an American 
company. 
As Stephen was saying it's a lot to learn about what it means to be 
a director, what it means to run a company effectively, from a corporate 
point of view. And I thought Chris' comments about the lack of 
corporate formalities was very telling, right. 'Cause you have 
companies that are created to be the American subsidiaries and they 
made them, and they just forgot about them. Right? Clearly there are 
problems there in terms of the guidance and the teaching structures that 
are going on, with at least some of these companies. 
And finally, I think also the other big, big difference is attitudes 
towards litigation, which Richard touched on. In the United States, 
litigation is very much a cost of doing business. Most general counsel 
just see it as something that they do; it's part of the cost structure like 
that. It's not a challenge to your bonify [phonetic]; it's not a challenge 
to your honor. In other parts of the world, and clearly what Rich was 
telling us in China for sure, it can be. And that's another important 
distinction to keep in mind. 
So as you represent Chinese clients, it seems to me these all 
important lessons that were brought forward today, and were definitely 
worth learning and worth thinking about, it raises another question, 
which is why are the Chinese bothering to come in in the first place? I 
mean there's a lot of money to be made in China. They don't really 
have to come here. Sometimes there are specific reasons, so you could 
say Alibaba wanted to do a class [phonetic] stock, they couldn't get that 
in Hong Kong, but they could get it here. 
But it seems to me there's a broader point as well, which is that I 
think this goes to the point about China's peaceful ride. Chinese 
companies wanting to become global companies, wanting to compete 
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with the best in the world, and that means entering the American 
markets. That means subjecting yourself to all of these rather strange 
and rigorous constraints that are going on. It seems to me that that's an 
important part of this discussion as well; just the big picture. That's a 
part of what we're seeing. And so the good news is that none of you 
folks are going to be without work anytime in the near future, no matter 
how scary you make the American litigation structure seem. 
And so I think I'll stop there and thank our panel one more time; 
and thank you all for coming. 
